The country is already the world’s leading producer of cobalt and tantalum and one of its largest copper producers, giving Kinshasa significant economic and geopolitical leverage. U.S. Geological Survey data show that in 2024 the DRC accounted for an estimated 75% of global cobalt production and 51% of tantalum production, while also ranking among the world’s leading copper producers.
That strategic position is at the heart of a new analysis by Canadian investigative journalist Judi Rever, published by Canadian Dimension under the headline “Congo is at the centre of a critical minerals race between China and the West.”
Rever’s central argument is that Congo should use mineral access as leverage to advance not only trade, but also sovereignty, peace and greater economic benefits for Congolese citizens.
“Congo’s sovereignty now has to be the essential condition for economic trade.”
The World Needs What Congo Has
The DRC’s mineral resources are central to several industries shaping the global economy.
Cobalt is widely used in batteries and specialized industrial applications. Copper is fundamental to power grids, electrical systems, data centres and industrial expansion. Tantalum, derived from coltan, is used in electronics and high-performance components.
The U.S. Geological Survey’s 2026 Mineral Commodity Summaries reinforce the scale of Congo’s importance to global mineral supply.
This makes the DRC more than simply a mineral-exporting country. It places Congo directly inside strategic decisions being made in China, the United States, Europe and other major industrial economies.
China and the West Are Competing for Critical Mineral Supply
Chinese companies established a major position in Congo’s copper and cobalt industries over many years.
At the same time, the United States and its partners have increasingly sought to diversify supply chains for minerals they regard as strategically important.
The competition is partly about mining, but it is also about processing, refining, transportation and industrial supply chains.
For Congo, that competition creates an opportunity to negotiate better terms rather than simply allowing outside powers to compete over access to raw materials.
Judi Rever: Peace and Sovereignty Should Be Part of the Deal
Rever’s analysis argues that privileged access to Congolese strategic minerals should be linked to respect for Congo’s territorial sovereignty and efforts to bring greater stability to eastern DRC.
That debate comes amid continuing international diplomacy over the conflict in eastern Congo.
In June 2026, the U.S. Treasury Department said Washington expected Rwanda to withdraw its troops and military equipment from the DRC and cease support for M23, while also calling on the DRC to neutralize the FDLR and affiliated groups.
The Treasury statement linked those expectations to commitments under the Washington peace framework.
For Kinshasa, one policy question is whether economic partnerships can be structured so that mineral access, regional security and lawful trade reinforce one another.
Ending Illicit Mineral Flows Is Also a Sovereignty Issue
The struggle over Congo’s mineral wealth is not limited to formal mining concessions.
A 2026 investigation by Global Witness reported that coltan from the Rubaya mines in eastern DRC was being smuggled through Rwanda and entering international supply chains. Global Witness said Rubaya produces roughly 15% of the world’s tantalum supply and alleged that significant volumes of conflict-linked coltan were entering supposedly legitimate trade channels.
These are findings by Global Witness and should be understood as such; companies and governments named in such investigations may dispute individual allegations.
The broader issue for Congo is traceability.
If minerals extracted from Congolese territory enter international markets through unauthorized networks, the state risks losing tax revenue while armed actors or illicit intermediaries may benefit.
Mineral Traceability Could Become Part of Congo’s Leverage
The global demand for responsible mineral sourcing gives the DRC another negotiating tool.
Kinshasa can push international buyers to demonstrate where minerals originate, identify traders and smelters, avoid supply linked to armed control and strengthen Congolese certification institutions.
This matters because major technology, automotive and defence companies increasingly face pressure to understand whether materials entering their supply chains are associated with conflict or human-rights abuses.
For the DRC, stronger traceability could help convert mineral sovereignty into both greater state revenue and stronger control over national resources.
Congo Wants More Than Raw-Material Exports
The larger economic challenge is moving beyond the export of unprocessed minerals.
A stronger long-term model would involve more processing, refining, logistics, certification, manufacturing and industrial services inside the DRC.
That could create Congolese jobs in engineering, geology, transport, mineral processing, laboratory testing, battery materials and other technical industries.
It could also allow the country to capture a greater share of the value generated after minerals leave the mine.
Infrastructure Should Be Part of Mineral Partnerships
The Congolese government can also use strategic mineral partnerships to negotiate tangible infrastructure.
That could include reliable electricity, roads, railways, water systems, border facilities, digital customs platforms, technical schools and healthcare infrastructure in producing regions.
For mining communities, the important test is whether global demand for Congo’s resources improves everyday economic conditions.
For young Congolese citizens, mineral partnerships could be judged partly by whether they create training, apprenticeships, scholarships, technology transfer and skilled employment.
Congo Does Not Have to Choose Only China or the United States
The DRC does not necessarily have to become exclusively aligned with either China or the United States.
Its strongest economic position may come from maintaining relationships with multiple partners while applying consistent national standards.
Kinshasa can work with China, the United States, the European Union, Gulf states and other investors, while requiring agreements to support Congolese priorities such as transparency, infrastructure, employment, technology transfer and lawful supply chains.
Competition among global powers can increase Congo’s bargaining power when the country negotiates from a clearly defined national strategy.
Minerals Can Become National Power — If Congo Captures the Value
Natural-resource wealth does not automatically create prosperity.
For minerals to become a source of durable national power, Congo would need stronger institutions capable of overseeing production, taxation, certification, exports and investment agreements.
It would also need to ensure that revenues generated by mineral development contribute to public infrastructure and services.
The strategic opportunity is therefore not simply that foreign powers want Congo’s minerals.
It is that the DRC can potentially use that demand to negotiate better economic terms, stronger supply-chain oversight and greater respect for its sovereignty.
Congo Is Already Central to the Critical-Minerals Economy
The numbers show why the world’s attention is increasing.
USGS data identify Congo as the world’s dominant cobalt producer and the leading tantalum producer, while Global Witness reporting illustrates how control of eastern mineral supply chains has become connected to regional security.
That gives Kinshasa leverage—but the benefits will depend on how effectively that leverage is converted into policy.
🇨🇩 Congo’s minerals can help power the global economy, but the strategic question for Kinshasa is whether that mineral wealth can also produce greater peace, sovereignty, industrial development and prosperity inside Congo itself.
About the Original Analysis
This article draws in part on arguments advanced by Canadian investigative journalist Judi Rever in “Congo is at the centre of a critical minerals race between China and the West”, published by Canadian Dimension.
Rever is also the author of In Praise of Blood: The Crimes of the Rwandan Patriotic Front and Rwanda’s 30-Year Assault on Congo: The Crimes, the Criminals, and the Cover-Up.
Key Sources:
U.S. Geological Survey — Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026
Global Witness — Investigation Into Conflict Coltan From DRC
U.S. Treasury — June 2026 DRC Sanctions Statement
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✍️ Author: Mangwa
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Mangwa mangwa
Mangwa Mangwa is the Founder of MECAMEDIA, a journalist, media professional, and political analyst committed to delivering credible news and meaningful stories from Africa and around the world. His work focuses on politics, leadership, business, community development, and current affairs, with a mission to inform, inspire, and connect communities through responsible journalism.